@mastersthesis{S05a,
	Abstract = {{Large-scale communication and traffic networks are systems which often lack a central regulation. Such an instance may even be inherently impossible if users---as is the case in traffic networks---are free to decide for themselves. Instead, it is often justified to assume that users act selfishly and non-cooperatively.

	This notion leads to classical game theory and a general model in which several players have to share common resources: the so-called congestion games. The most important solution concept in game theory is arguably the Nash equilibrium, which---under the assumption of rational behavior of all participants---describes potential resolutions to the strategic interdependences. It characterizes a "stable" state in which no player can improve unilaterally, that is, no player has a rational incentive to change his current strategy.

	The main property of resources in congestion games is their costs being dependent on the number or the "weight" of the users utilizing them. This is described by latency functions. In this thesis, we measure the quality of a possible outcome of a game---called strategy profile---by the total latency incurred. It seems intuitive that in these settings a Nash equilibrium is not necessarily system optimal. Here, the price of anarchy denotes the worst-case ratio between a Nash equilibrium and a system optimum.
	
	In the main part of this thesis, we show exact values for the price of anarchy of weighted and unweighted congestion games with polynomial latency functions. These values remain valid even if one considers only network congestion games in which players' strategies correspond to paths in a network.}},
	Author = {Schoppmann, Florian},
	Month = nov,
	School = {University of Paderborn, Germany},
	Title = {Price of Anarchy for Congestion Games with Polynomial Latency Functions},
	Url = {http://www.upb.de/cs/ag-monien/PERSONAL/FSCHOPP/pdf/DiplomarbeitFlorianSchoppmann.pdf},
	Year = {2005}}