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Seminar Algorithmische Spieltheorie (MuA)

(Prof. Dr. Burkhard Monien, Sommersemester 2006)



Blockseminar Montag, 23. Oktober im Raum F1.310:

Vortragszeit: 45 Minuten pro Person

Zeit Papiertitel Papierautor(en) Betreuer Student
8:00-9:00 Strategyproof Cost-Sharing Mechanisms for Set Cover and Facility Location Games Devanur, Mihail, Vazirani. Florian Schoppmann Daniel Rudolph
9:00-10:00 Truthful Mechanisms for One Parameter Agents Archer, Tardos Yvonne Bleischwitz Jonas Schulte
10:00-10:15

Kaffeepause

10:15-11:15 Truthful Approximation Mechanisms for Restricted Combinatorial Auctions Mu'alem, Nisan Dominic Dumrauf Lars Schäfers
11:15-12:15 Group-Strategyproof Mechanisms via Primal-Dual Algorithms Pal, Tardos Karsten Tiemann Felix Pottmeyer
12:15-13:45

Mittagspause

13:45-14:45 Cost-Sharing Mechanisms for Network Design Gupta, Srinivasan, Tardos Karsten Tiemann Björn Zeiger
14:45-15:45 Cross-Monotonic Cost Sharing Methods for Connected Facility Location Games Leonardi, Schäfer Karsten Tiemann Daniel Dau
15:45-16:00

Kaffeepause

16:00-17:00 Limitations of Cross-Monotonic Cost-Sharing Schemes Immorlica, Mahdian, Mirrokni Yvonne Bleischwitz Stefan Feldkord
17:00-18:00 Sharing the Cost of Multicast Transmission Feigenbaum, Papadimitriou, Shenker, Florian Schoppmann Martin Steinhoff




Blockseminar 5. und 6. Juli im Raum F1.310:

Mittwoch, 5.7.2006 von 9:15-12:00

Papiertitel Papierautor(en) Betreuer Student(en)
The price of anarchy of finite congestion games Christodoulou, Koutsoupias Florian Schoppmann Pierre Nya
Congestion Games with Player-Specific Payoff Functions Milchtaich Karsten Tiemann Dennis Hannwacker
Routing (Un-) Splittable Flow in Games with Player-Specific Linear Latency Functions Gairing, Monien, Tiemann Karsten Tiemann Alexander Gebel

Mittwoch, 5.7.2006 von 14:15-16:00

Papiertitel Papierautor(en) Betreuer Student(en)
How Bad is Selfish Routing? Roughgarden, Tardos Rainer Feldmann Frank Hellweg
Network Games with Atomic Players. Cominetti, Correa, Stier-Moses Florian Schoppmann Matthias Kirschner

Donnerstag, 6.7.2006 von 9:15-12:45

Papiertitel Papierautor(en) Betreuer Student(en)
Fast, Fair, and Efficient Flows in Networks. Correa, Schulz, Stier-Moses Tobias Tscheuschner Andreas Kumlehn
Selfish Routing in Capacitated Networks. Correa, Schulz, Stier-Moses Florian Schoppmann Martin Polaczy
On the Inefficiency of Equilibria in Nonatomic Congestion Games. Correa, Schulz, Stier-Moses Tobias Tscheuschner Tobias Volkhausen
Combinatorial Algorithms for the Unsplittable Flow Problem. Azar, Regev Rainer Feldmann Benjamin Wehe

Donnerstag, 6.7.2006 von 14:15-16:45

Papiertitel Papierautor(en) Betreuer Student(en)
A Microscopic Simulator for Freeway Traffic and Online Simulations of Large Scale Networks. Pottmeier, Chrobok, Wahle, Schreckenberg. Rainer Feldmann Sven Kindermann
Improved Bounds for Vehicle Routing Solutions. Bompadre, Dror, Orlin Florian Schoppmann Philipp Schengbier
Approximation Algorithms for Some Vehicle Routing Problems. Bazgan, Hassin, Monnot Tobias Tscheuschner Markus Eberling




Ergänzende Informationen




- Martin Gairing, Karsten Tiemann